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with Chinese sources, it provides a yardstick from the pre-1949 years against which to make judgments. In this respect, it is greatly preferable to Hsu's, who studied communities actually much more representative of Han than of Bai people. However, for the PRC period, my sources have been overwhelmingly written in Chinese. Historically, the Bai wrote their own language with Chinese characters because they lacked their own orthography. A Bai writing system based on Latin letters was devised in the late 1950s, but even now virtually all Bai writers use Chinese.3 Ethnologists carried out some very useful fieldwork among the minority nationalities in the 1950s, early 1960s, and 1980s, the interruption being due to the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s there has been an explosion of publication of their findings. Again because of the Cultural Revolution, much of the material collected in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and even later has had to wait until the 1980s to be published. This means that a few of the sources used actually refer to the 1950s and later, although not published until the 1980s, but care has been taken to ensure that the date of reference is clear in all cases. I have supplemented these sources with material derived from a very brief but completely self-managed and unsupervised visit to the DAP in November 1985 and conversations with two Bai cadres at the Central Institute of Nationalities in Beijing in March 1986.
RELIGION
The Bai people place no emphasis on categorizing religions by name. They are quite happy to accept deities from the local pantheon, or from the Buddhist or Daoist. Shamanistic rites coexist with Buddhist. However, although religious beliefs are vague, their traditional strength is considerable. A Bai veterinary surgeon with whom I chanced to spend several hours in Dali assured me that still today all Bai people "believe in religion" (xinjiao). He was equally insistent that the figure included the members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), despite his very obvious enthusiasm for the current socialist order. The Bai cadres at the Nationalities Institute in Beijing agreed that religious influence was still very strong, especially among rural women, the middle-aged, and the old, but considered it on the wane in the younger generation.
An important form of religion among the Bai is known in Chinese as chongbai benzhu, "worship of the local tutelary spirits." It is "based on the ancient Bai traditional nature and ancestor worship" but has absorbed "some elements of Daoist and Buddhist content" (Song, 1985a: 63) . Among all China's minority nationalities, the Bai rank first or nearly so for the prevalence of Mahayana Buddhism (Ma et al., 1984: 430). Daoism and shamanism have exercised an influence.
FitzGerald claims (1941: 146-147) that the Christian missions enjoyed but scant success: "The idea of an exclusive creed, the one true way distinct from all others that are false, is so unfamiliar to their mental habits as to be barely comprehensible." Although the missionaries did establish a few churches, almost all were destroyed or taken over for other purposes after their departure, and there are hardly any Bai Christians today. 4 The main religions that derive from the Bai themselves, rather than being introductions from other nationalities, are the folk cults of the "local tutelary spirits." There is an enormous variety of these deities, and although most are specific to a single village, some are found more widely (Zhang and Zhang, 1985: 73). In the villages of Dali County, which lies some 15 kilometers north of Xiaguan, there are 60 local tutelary spirits-39 male and 21 female (Du et al., 1983: 67 ). An important example is the Chinese General Li Mi, who led an unsuccessful Tang invasion of Nanzhao in 754 (Backus, 1981: 75-76 ) and was killed near Xiaguan. At that time the capital lay between the present-day Xiaguan and Dali. The local people elevated their defeated enemy to the status of a tutelary spirit "to console his departed spirit" (Song, 1985a: 63), and his image may be found in some village temples even now.
These local tutelary spirits fall into five main categories. There are spirits who created the world, those associated with nature worship, such as earth, sun, moon, river, or mountain spirits (Song, 1985c: 296); national heroes or good and notable people, "some of them heroic persons who eliminated evils for the people" (Ma, 1986: 38); "personalities of the ruling classes" like princes of the Nanzhao and Dali periods; and deities introduced from Buddhism. Ancestors may be distributed across most of these various categories. There is a legend associated with almost all local tutelary spirits. They are highly anthropomorphic and sometimes a love relationship exists between male and female local gods. Many have spouses and children, friends, or siblings (Zhang and Zhang, 1985: 73).
Fish and conches are prominent among the local tutelary spirits associated with nature worship. Temples dedicated to fish or conch spirits are common and the manifestations of worship accorded them are numerous in Bai society. Even in the 1980s, many Bai villages on the banks of the Erhai Lake bury live fish and conches in earthenware jars together with their dead. A contemporary Bai scholar suggests that this practice springs from the hope and belief that the water spirits can protect and grant peace to the dead relation (Zhang, 1981: 77).
The image of the local tutelary spirit resides in the temple. As everywhere in China, most temples were either totally demolished or partly damaged, or their images destroyed, during the Cultural Revolution, but most have now been restored and new ones built, in some cases at considerable government expense. The Bai cadres of the Nationalities Institute told me that there were actually more temples now than before the Cultural Revolution. In Dali County, I was assured by several local people that every village now had its own temple and in a few cases was able to check that this was true. In Zhoucheng, several kilometers north of the county town, there is a small temple at the top of the village, which is itself situated on the side of a hill. The main hall contains several images and I was informed by a group of villagers that it was still functioning for religious purposes. However, the large courtyard in front of the main hall was being used to sunbake rice. In another nearby village the temple was in use, with some old women worshipping, but the temple was not in good repair, and there was no sign of an active religious life. On a high hill prominently overlooking Xiaguan is a large temple formerly dedicated to Li Mi, but as of November 1985, most of it had fallen into disrepair and been taken over as citizens' houses, while the main halls, standing proudly right on top of the hill, had become the local CCP headquarters.
Once or several times a year there is, in every village, a ceremony of sacrifice to the local god at the temple. The time is the feast day of the god, which varies according to the individual. According to data collected about 1960, the people kill a pig, chicken, or goat for sacrifice and process to the temple; after the ceremony there are celebrations and rejoicing, which may go on for three days (Wang et al., 1983: 207) . These functions are called "temple gatherings" (miaohui).
The sacrifices involved in the temple gatherings can be very expensive. In 1949, one village of 15 families in Eryuan County, central DAP, spent over one-fifth of its total income on sacrifices (Wang et al., 1983: 210) . Since 1949, the CCP has applied pressure to reduce the amount of the sacrifices and in the Cultural Revolution tried to prevent them altogether. While they have resumed in the 1980s, the cost of the sacrifices is generally very small by comparison with the pre-1949 period.
A group of specialists runs the affairs of the Bai religions of the local tutelary spirits. They may be male or female, but the latter are the great majority. They are semiprofessionals only, retaining their normal jobs as peasants or housewives. Their training includes dancing and singing (Yang Kai, 1985: 83) .
The reason for this is that one of the main functions of these specialists is to perform dances during religious processions and temple gatherings. The females may lead off the procession waving a handkerchief in a dancing motion or "interchange dancing and singing with the masses worshipping the local tutelary spirit" (Song, 1985c: 296). In the past, the specialists also functioned as doctors-for instance, by advising a sick person wherein he or she had offended the local tutelary spirit and how amends could be made to win a cure. At least in Heqing County, the fee was a bowl of rice, an egg, and some money (Yang Kai, 1985: 84) . Another possibility was "to dance out the ghost," that is, to exorcise, through a religious dance, a malevolent spirit that was causing illness (FitzGerald, 1941: 128-129).
The Nowadays there are no longer many achili with legal status. As for the informal achili, they can be found everywhere in the villages, but the trend is for them to decline. Of course their religious organizations will not last long. But nobody should underestimate the poison of their ideas. A great deal of cultural education work over a long period will be necessary before the backward peasants can be liberated from the influence of the Achili Doctrine.
It comes as no surprise that the value judgment should be so negative. But Zhang's prediction is uncompromising and suggests that the Bai people still take a great deal of notice of the informal Buddhist masters.
One of the tasks of the acarya is to manage pious women who form societies "which take a vow of partial or total abstinence from meat and wine" (FitzGerald, 1941: 114). The women also chant scriptures or repeat the names of Amida or Guanyin before the altars in the temples. Zhang Xu (1985: 60) recalls that his grandmother, who died in 1922, was a "scriptures mother" (iingmu) in one of these societies and that she or his grandfather would offer incense twice a day at the family altar. "If I was beside her, my grandmother would get me to kneel down with her and say 'Amida."' Perhaps more interesting, he relates that in 1976, during a recuperative visit to his old home, he saw his eldest brother's wife get her five-year-old grandson to perform the same ritual. Considering that the post-Cultural Revolution religious revival did not begin until several years later, the story suggests considerable tenacity in the domestic Buddhist practices of the Bai.
On the other hand, public and formal Buddhism as practiced by monks and others in temples has weakened greatly under the PRC. The number of monks and nuns is far smaller now than it was before 1949. FitzGerald writes (1941: 112-113) that the Guanyin tang just south of the Dali county town was "the principal Buddhist temple in the district" in the late 1930s. Under the CCP, it became a hospital and then a home for the aged. I was able to visit this temple in November 1985 and found that the beautiful architecture and other art were in excellent repair. I was assured by several people I met there that the temple was still functioning as such. However, there was no sign of any monks. 
MARRIAGE, WOMEN
Among China's minority nationalities religion has always assumed a very high priority and is consequently a major criterion by which to test social continuity and change. Another one, no less significant, is marriage.
Among the Bai an important prelude to marriage is courtship. One recent and major study of the marriage practices of Yunnan's minority nationalities states that "the love life of Bai nationality young people is comparatively free. They ordinarily use the opportunities that labour, village fairs, festival day activities, and temple gatherings afford to talk of love" (Yang et al., 1983: 32).
As with other Yunnan nationalities, a main traditional method of courting is through rural folk songs termed mountain songs (shan'ge) (see Mackerras, 1984: 195, 198 The Bai cadres at the Nationalities Institute in Beijing told me of four categories of marriage in the 1980s. The most frequent is marriages in which the parents choose the spouse and arrange for a matchmaker to introduce the couple unless they are already friends, but if either partner shows reluctance at any stage, the match is automatically called off. Another system, gaining popularity in the towns but still rare in the countryside, is for the couple to agree on marriage themselves and then seek the approval of their parents, who enjoy the right of veto. The third and fourth categories are forced arranged marriages carried out against the wishes of either spouse, and unions that take place in the teeth of opposition from either partner's parents. Both types, the Bai cadres claimed, were very rare nowadays. They also said child betrothals were all but extinct and those of infants totally so.
The above accounts suggest that, despite the continuing dominant role of parents in deciding the marriage partner of their children, the latter enjoy more freedom of choice, and especially of veto, now than was the case in the past. The four categories of marriage are reasonable ones, but the dividing lines between them may not always be clear. Thus marriages that take place despite opposition either from parents or one of the partners may in fact result from a process of persuasion among the various concerned parties, and the parents are likely to be in a stronger position to get their way than their children. This is why the first of the four categories may not be as dominant over the third as it appears. One irony is that the opportunities for free courtship that have always been part of Bai culture have contributed so little to the free choice of marriage partners. This comment holds true both for the past before liberation and for the years since the Cultural Revolution, during the 10 years of which the social customs favoring free courtship were suppressed. Despite the revival of free courtship and the advances of recent years, it will clearly be a very long time before the ideal is reached by which only marriage partners themselves decide on their spouse.
The days of the weddings themselves were formerly chosen by horoscope. FitzGerald writes (1941: 160) that the calendar marked days appropriate to weddings, as a result of which several weddings quite often happened in the same village or neighborhood on the same day. The Bai cadres of the Nationalities Institute told me that the horoscope is still the normal way to decide the wedding day in the villages, though this is losing ground in the towns. They added that the winter months of the old lunar calendar are those most favored for weddings. While in the DAP, I briefly attended two weddings and saw four bridal processions on the same day in villages just north of Dali county town, but saw no sign of weddings on any other day. The concentration on a single day is readily explainable by the continued use of the horoscope, and my visit happened to fall in a winter month.
The traditional practice is for the bridegroom to collect the bride, whose family should ritually show her their love by reluctance to open the door to him. Led by a player of the double-reeded suona,7 he takes her by sedan chair to his family, where a bridal chamber and feast have been prepared. According to FitzGerald (1941: 162), richer families maintained the festivities for three days, beginning a day before the marriage and continuing to the end of the day after the reception of the bride. Nowadays, weddings last no more than a single day.
At those weddings I saw, the bride wore a blouse, red trousers, and dark glasses, somewhat different from the ordinary female Bai garb and a little more elaborate, while the groom was indistinguishable from the male guests except for a floral ring around his neck. Wedding dress today is very much simpler than in the past. A suona player led off the procession with the bridal sedan chair not far behind, followed by a box containing the worldly possessions of the bride. In one instance the chair-bearers were resting by the road chatting with the couple, the suona player, and others. This contrasts with past customs when, according to FitzGerald (1941: 160), the sedan chair was closed to prevent the bearers from seeing the face of another man's bride, but in fact it is still taboo for the bride to show her eyes, which is why she wears dark glasses. During the feast, a fine spread with plenty of food, tea, and cigarettes, the couple sat in their bridal chamber and opened a wooden window to receive the good wishes of the guests, but otherwise remained invisible. Weddings nowadays appear to bear the strong imprint of Bai tradition, itself much influenced by the Han, but to lack the ornateness and formalism of at least those of the rich of the past. 8 Usually, it is the woman who marries into her husband's family. However, if a couple has an only daughter, it may invite a prospective son-in-law to join the family, in which case he adopts his wife's surname permanently and can obtain inheritance rights over his new family's property (Wang et al., 1983: 193; Ma, 1986: 38) . If a woman is the eldest child and has brothers but no sister, she can return to her own family, with her new husband, a week after the wedding and stay there until her brothers have married and her responsibility toward her old parents is complete, after which the couple return to the husband's family. These three traditional patterns, writes a recent study, "have persisted right till the present" (Yang et al., 1983: 37).
If the one-child-per-couple policy becomes universal among the Bai, the third pattern will decline sharply, while competition among families over whether to follow the first or second will become intense. At present, autonomous regions, prefectures, and counties may decide on their own population policies. In the 1980s, it is policy in the DAP that, in the towns, everybody, whether Han or minority nationality, is restricted to one child only; Bai peasants may have two children but for a third must pay a fine, varying from place to place, but about Y120. Signs and posters in Dali and Xiaguan towns advocating family planning and single children are numerous. On the other hand, in those several villages I visited near Dali county town, the number of children under five was noticeably larger than in other Han rural areas in Yunnan and Sichuan that I saw at about the same time. Clearly, many peasants are both able and willing to pay the fine for the third child and in some cases it may not even be enforced.9 Eventually the CCP may start pressing seriously for the rural Bai people to introduce the one-child-per-couple policy, but a long time will elapse before it is successful or effective enough to influence marriage practices.
Among the Bai, the dominant marriage system has always been one man, one wife. In the past, rich men occasionally took a concubine, almost never more than one, and only under very special circumstances. The main one was the wife's failure to bear a child (FitzGerald, 1941: 164) In many ways, Chuichui qiang was traditionally very similar to a Han drama style. The character-types were divided into sheng (male), dan (female), jing (painted face), and chou (clown). 13 The costumes, properties, and makeup were similar to Han Chinese drama forms, including colored makeup worn by jing and other performers (Yunnan, 1985: 130). The song sections were accompanied only by percussion instruments, just as in Yiyang qiang drama. Many of the actors' movements were highly stylized. The Chinese language was used in many items.
There were, however, strong Bai characteristics in Chuichui qiang. Most dramas were performed in the Bai language. The main metrical structure of the stanzas was the familiar threesevens, one-five over four lines (Wang, 1985: 47) . There was a stronger emphasis on dance than in Han drama styles and one source (Wang et al., 1983: 217) In the Han Chinese regional theater, most items perform stories that are more or less nationwide, with only a few being based on local stories. The same was so of Chuichui qiang. In other words, the majority followed Han legends, love stories, or excerpts from history, but there were also some that were based on Bai stories. As of 1985, "five or six old artists could remember some 300 items, of which 80 had already been written down" On the other hand, there are also some countersigns. Bai communities such as those explored by Francis Hsu are now officially encouraged to take pride in the Bai nationality, not to see themselves as assimilated with the Han. Since marriage customs are probably changing more slowly among the Bai than the Han, it follows that the degree of acculturation in this particular aspect is actually slighter now than before the revolution. The same may be so of some aspects of the performing arts. Thus the greater emphasis on Bai content in the Daben qu and Bai dramas since 1949 suggests a weaker acculturation, not a stronger. A Bai drama resembles a Han regional one less than a Chuichui qiang does in the abandonment of the role-types sheng, dan, and so on, and in its more pronounced inclusion of the song and dance of the Bai nationality.
On the whole, the factors tending toward acculturation are more important and stronger than those against. This does not mean that Bai culture is on the point of extinction or anywhere near it. The fact that the CCP has set up an "autonomous prefecture" for the Bai, while the Guomindang did not, shows that the authorities are keener to retain a distinctive culture for the Bai, and indeed other minority nationalities, than they were before 1949. The traditional Bai "worship of the local tutelary spirits" and Bai aspects of Buddhism and Daoism may be much weaker than they were but show no signs of dying out. The Bai spoken language will remain in use for a very long time.
FitzGerald's comment that the Bai in the late 1930s lacked a "strong national feeling" (1941: 14) is still valid today. It seems that the Bai are quite happy with the strengthened acculturation of the 1980s. One reason for this is the immeasurably greater economic development and higher standard of living that have accompanied it. In addition, their history, and, in particular, long experience of dealing with the Han, have given them great skills in coping with the process of acculturation. The Han have rarely either needed or wanted to practice against the Bai that kind of forced assimilation implied in the Chinese term tonghua. In current official thinking, the Cultural Revolution years saw policies of assimilation adopted against the minority nationalities, but those experienced in Bai areas were relatively mild. This is strongly suggested by the way Bai people speak of the years 1966 to 1976, in comparison with the Tibetans, Uygurs, Kazakhs, or Dai, to name but a few examples.
Many of the issues involved in the discussion of the extent of the acculturation process under the PRC are relevant also to the question of continuity and change in Bai culture. The three most important changes are probably the elimination of the class of rich landowners, the introduction of socialism, and an incipient modernization that, while it has not yet gone far by comparison with an advanced country, is still more profound than anything the pre-1949 years could offer in the way of industry or technology. In the particular areas of culture discussed in this article, factors to follow from these changes include the disappearance of concubinage, the weakening of religious institutions of all kinds, and the professionalization of the performing arts.
At the same time a great deal of the old society remains: the belief in religions and the practices associated with them, the persistence of arranged marriages, even though with much more consultation with the relevant partner than in the past, the mass festivals and the open-air village drama performances. Collectively these are by no means a trivial part of the social fabric.
Tradition is proving somewhat more tenacious than the CCP initially hoped or even expected.
A potential motor for change would be a determined attempt to reduce the population growth rate through introducing the one-child-per-couple policy. Over time this would affect the structure of the family, and the resultant loss of its cohesion would weaken the social power of the family as an institution. Since Bai society is tightly integrated, other aspects of society would certainly change as well. A lower population growth rate would mean higher individual consumption, better health and education levels, and an acceleration of economic development, which would inevitably influence the people's social values and beliefs.
Some of the changes introduced so far can be described as additions to society. Thus the CCP has added socialism rather than destroying the old patterns of thought. The professionalized performing arts have not so much attacked the traditional as tended to replace them and thus begun to render them redundant. Other changes involve a direct undermining of traditional society, such as land reform and measures to cut the population growth rate.
One could call the "additions" overlays upon a more basic continuity. However, if what is under consideration is the longrange effect rather than the current reality, then it might be more reasonable to see the changes as a whole as fundamental, the continuities merely as strong survivals from the past. The impact of the new education, and economic development are still in their early stages and are likely to gather momentum in the coming decades, especially if the population policy currently practiced among the Han is applied also among the Bai. This process will imply acceleration in the decline of religion, of the practice of arranged marriages, of the authentic traditional nonprofessional folk arts, and so on.
The main features of social change are in the direction of acculturation and conformity with the Han. It follows that as the changes gather momentum, so also will the process of acculturation. Although the Bai are unlikely ever to abandon some of their customs or art-styles, their culture could eventually become similar enough in its essentials to the Han to call them "amalgamated." If and when that happens, it will more likely result from economic and social modernization than from compulsion, which means that it is a long way in the future. Nevertheless, since the Bai were, of China's more populous minority nationalities, among the most acculturated with the Han already in 1949, the likelihood is that, if they do indeed suffer amalgamation, they will be among the first of the larger minorities to do so. 17. In a discussion of "West Town" and its satellite villages, among which the inhabitants of all but one village were actually Bai but almost entirely amalgamated with the Han, Francis Hsu notes that the mother tongue of the people was Bai. He adds that "most men and a few women, however, speak Chinese (with a strong local accent) as well" (1943: 3).
